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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3. 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues Presented: (1) The Andersons' first issue on appeal is whether the trial 
court erred in concluding that a Trust Deed was not a valid agreement due to failure of 
consideration. There was never any exchange of promises, bargaining or communication 
whatsoever between the parties named in the Trust Deed. Allen Olsen signed the Trust 
Deed solely to allow his son to use it as security to get a loan to buy Allen's insurance 
business, but Allen never received payment for the insurance business or consideration of 
any kind because his son called off the business sale a few days after Olsen signed the 
Trust Deed. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this issue is one of correctness, 
with no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Wayment v. Clear Channel 
Board, Inc., 2005 UT 25,116 P.3d 271, f 15. 
(2) The Andersons' second issue on appeal is a new issue, which has been raised 
for the first time on appeal: whether equitable estoppel should compel enforcement of a 
trust deed where the parties to the Trust Deed never communicated at all, but the Trust 
Deed beneficiaries relied on a Trust Deed presented to them by a third party in making a 
loan to a trustor which was ultimately defaulted by said trustor. 
Standard of Review: Issues raised for the first time on appeal are not reviewed by 
appellate courts. Dominguez v. Reward, 2006 UT App 20. However, if this court 
determines that equitable estoppel was properly raised before the trial court and is not a 
new issue presented for the first time on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, 
because it is a mixed question of law and fact, "we properly grant the trial court's 
decision a fair degree of deference when we review the mixed question of whether the 
requirements of the law of estoppel have been satisfied in any given factual situation." 
State v. Irizany, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997). "The variety of fact-intensive 
circumstances involved [in equitable estoppel cases] weighs heavily against lightly 
substituting our judgment for that of the trial court. Therefore, we properly grant the trial 
court's decision a fair degree of deference when we review the mixed question of whether 
the requirements of the law of estoppel have been satisfied in any given factual 
situation." Butler, Crockett & Walsh v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 2004 UT 67, \ 45, quoting 
Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The court should "not reverse 
the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are . . . clearly 
erroneous." Irizarry, at 678. Indeed, "[a] trial court's finding of fact is not clearly 
erroneous unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence or we reach a definite and 
clear conclusion that a mistake has been made." Flake v. Flake, 71 P.3d 589, f 27, (Utah 
2003). Notwithstanding, because this argument is raised for the first time on appeal, the 
trail court has made no ruling on an estoppel theory that can be reviewed on appeal. 
VI. CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(3). This statute defines a Trust Deed as a deed made 
pursuant to the statutory requirements for Trust Deeds "and conveying real property to a 
trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person 
named in the deed to a beneficiary." This language is repeated in Utah Code Ann. § 57-
1-20, which states that "transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the 
performance of an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to 
a beneficiary." 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN COURTS BELOW 
On May 16, 2003, the Andersons filed a Verified Complaint to foreclose a Trust 
Deed dated November 12, 1998, asserting that Allen Olsen had defaulted on an alleged 
note referenced in said Trust Deed, which the Andersons claimed required payments of 
$1,351.00 per month at 6.9% interest. R. 1-11H 10, 12, 13. On June 19, 2003, the 
Andersons filed an Amended Verified Complaint with the same allegations. R. 18-28, 
1110,12,13. 
On August 8, 2003, Defendant Allen Olsen filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to 
Dismiss and accompanying Memorandum, stating that he was never a party to or even 
aware of any note or note terms in favor of the Andersons that was supposedly in default, 
and further that any note that may have existed was between the Andersons and Steve 
Olsen (Allen's son) and Steve's former wife Sheila Olsen (the Andersons' daughter) who 
were married at the time the Trust Deed was executed. R. 37-39, 47-70. These points 
were later included in an Affidavit of Allen Olsen which the Andersons have not 
disputed. R. 115-116. The Andersons admit no signed note exists in this case. R. 346, 
11:10-17. 
On October 30, 2003, the parties filed a Stipulation for Dismissal of Max wen B. 
Olsen and Reservation of Issues in Defeadant Allen Olsen's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, 
whereby they stipulated to dismiss Allen Olsen's deceased wife Maxwen from the suit, 
and to reserve all issues raised by Allen Olsen's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss to be 
restated in an anticipated Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 79-80. The court signed 
an order to this effect on November 5, 2003. R. 81-82. 
On March 25, 2004, Defendant Allen Olsen filed an Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Third-party Complaint, restating the points defenses raised in his Motion 
to Dismiss, and also asserting a claim of unjust enrichment against Sheila Olsen. R. 83-
90. 
The parties then each filed their respective Motions for Summary Judgment, and 
Memorandum in Opposition and Replies in respect thereto. R. 104-235. Oral argument 
on the motions was held on January 11, 2006. R. 241. 
On March 2, 2006, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision on the Motions for 
Summary Judgment in which the court granted Allen Olsen's motion and denied that of 
the Andersons, on the basis that the Trust Deed was not a valid agreement due to failure 
of consideration, and because Allen Olsen never signed a promissory note to evidence the 
debt under the Trust Deed. An Order to this effect was filed on March 23, 2006, which 
contained Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R, 309-324. 
On April 21, 2006, the Andersons filed their Notice of Appeal. R. 334-335. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 1, 1995, Allen Olsen and Steve Olsen signed documents 
whereby Allen's son Steve would purchase Allen's insurance business in Sanpete 
County. Although the documents were signed by both parties, the transaction was never 
consummated because Steve Olsen failed to obtain the necessary funds for the purchase. 
R. 319,1fl. 
2. Three years later, in November, 1998, Steve Olsen again told his father that 
he wanted to buy the insurance business. He also told his father that he intended to 
borrow the money for the purchase from Boyd and Marilyn Anderson, Steve's parents-in-
law at that time. R.319. 
3. The Andersons wanted to have some security for their loan to Steve and 
prepared the Deed of Trust, which was between Allen Olsen and Maxzwen Olsen 
(Allen's wife, now deceased) as trustors, and Boyd and Marilyn Anderson as 
beneficiaries. The property referenced in the Trust Deed was Allen Olsen's real property 
located in Sanpete County. R. 319-320. 
4. The Trust Deed made reference to a separate note between the Andersons 
and Allen Olsen. However, the Andersons have never produced a copy of this note, and 
Allen Olsen never signed any such note, and never even saw such note or was made 
aware of its terms or its existence. Allen Olsen never had any communications 
whatsoever with the Andersons regarding this Trust Deed and/or note. R. 26-28, 56-57, 
123-124, 320. The Andersons admit there is no signed note in this case. R. 346, 11:10-
17. 
5. Steve Olsen (Allen's son) and Sheila Olsen (the Andersons' daughter) were 
still married in the late 1990s when the Trust Deed was executed, but have since 
divorced. Steve Olsen has since declared Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and has received a 
discharge of his debts, and moved for dismissal from the present suit. R. 34-37, 87. 
6. Steve Olsen asked his father to sign the Deed of Trust to secure the loan 
from the Andersons that Steve Olsen would have used to pay the purchase price for Allen 
Olsen's business. R. 320. 
7. On November 12, 1998, Allen Olsen signed the Deed of Trust which said 
that it secured a promissory note for the principal sum of $140,000.00 made by the 
Trustor (Allen Olsen and his wife) and payable to the order of the beneficiary (Boyd and 
Marilyn Anderson). No promissory note was ever executed by Allen Olsen or his wife, 
and Allen Olsen never saw a note or was made aware of even the existence of any note.1 
R. 26-28, 56-57, 123-124, 320. 
8. A few days later, Steve Olsen approached his father and told Allen that he 
was not going to buy the insurance business. Allen Olsen has never sold his business to 
Steve Olsen. R. 320. It was Allen Olsen's understanding when his son told him this that 
the deal was off and the Trust Deed was void, and would not be used for any other 
purpose. R. 115-116. 
1
 The Memorandum Decision issued by the court and the court's order both also state that 
"signatures of both parties appeared on the Deed of Trust." R. 311, 320. However, the 
reference to 'both parties' appears to be ambiguous, since it is not clear if it referred to 
Allen and Maxwen Olsen, or the Olsens and the Andersons. Use of the word 'parties' 
and the statement that "Allen Olsen signed the Deed of Trust" suggests the latter. 
However, this would be contrary to the facts, since the Trust Deed on its face indicates 
that it was not signed by the Andersons, but only by Allen and Maxwen Olsen. R. 26-28. 
9. Steve and Sheila Olsen used the Trust Deed signed by Allen Olsen as 
collateral to obtain a larger loan from the Andersons in the sum of $151,000.00 to pay off 
a number of personal debts. The Andersons knew when they made the loan that it was 
not for Steve to buy Allen's business/ The money was disbursed two weeks after the 
Andersons received the Deed of Trust from Steve Olsen and recorded it. R. 220-221, 
320. 
10. Allen Olsen never had any communications with the Andersons concerning 
the loan to Steve and Sheila Olsen; neither did Allen Olsen receive any money or 
consideration from the Andersons. Allen Olsen did not promise to pay the debt of his son 
and daughter-in-law to the Andersons. R. 56-57, 320. 
11. The Andersons loaned the money to Steve and Sheila Olsen to be repaid at 
an annual interest rate of 6.9%, in monthly payments of $ 1,351.00. R. 283, 321. Allen 
Olsen was unaware of this loan or its terms until the commencement of the present suit. 
2
 This fact is taken from the Affidavit of Steve Olsen. R. 220-221. The trial court 
indicated in a footnote of its Memorandum Decision (R. 310) that it would not include 
the facts from this affidavit because counsel for the Andersons verbally represented at the 
January 11, 2006—as a matter of law—that Steve supposedly could not be deposed 
because his debt was discharged in bankruptcy. However, the Andersons never filed a 
Motion to Strike this affidavit. Furthermore, the automatic stay does not prevent the 
Andersons from deposing Steve in respect to their suit against Allen, since "generally, the 
automatic stay provision of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code does not extend to 
actions against parties other than the debtor." Paine v. Sealey, 956 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. 
App. 1997). In addition, the Explanation of Discharge indicated that it did not apply to a 
mortgage or security interest, such as that at issue in the present case. R. 45. Finally, 
even if the Andersons were somehow prevented from deposing Steve due to the 
automatic stay, they could still petition to have the stay lifted in order to allow the 
deposition. 11 USC § 362(d). Hence, the Andersons were not prevented from deposing 
Steve Olsen as they alleged, and it should therefore be permissible to refer to the facts in 
his affidavit. 
R. 115-116. 
12. Steve and Sheila Olsen fulfilled their obligation by making monthly 
payments on their loan with the Andersons until July 2001 when they defaulted. R. 321. 
Accordingly, they paid over $40,000 on the loan. 
13. Steve Olsen's obligation to the Andersons was discharged in bankruptcy, 
and the Andersons are now seeking to foreclose on the Deed of Trust. R. 321. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trust Deed is not enforceable and is not a valid agreement due to lack of 
consideration and failure of consideration. Allen Olsen5 s pledge of collateral by way of 
the Trust Deed was solely in exchange for Steve Olsen's promise to buy the business. 
When Steve told Allen the sale would not go through, the agreed upon exchange no 
longer existed and there was a lack of consideration. Where a party is neither a lender 
nor a borrower and receives no consideration in exchange for the use of a trust deed of its 
property as security for a loan, there is a lack of consideration. There was no 
communication or bargaining at all between Allen Olsen and the Andersons, and no 
agreement between them regarding consideration. This is not a case where two parties 
communicated with each other and agreed that the consideration that would normally go 
to one of them would be given instead to a third party. The Andersons have not contested 
the court's finding that Steve did not act on behalf of Allen Olsen when Steve received 
loan funds from the Andersons. Allen Olsen never agreed with the Andersons that a 
$151,000 loan to his son would satisfy his consideration. None of the terms of the note 
or debt as claimed by the Andersons were included or made part of the Trust Deed. See 
R. 18 at f^ 10, and compare to R. 26-28. As lenders to Steve and Sheila Olsen, the 
Andersons bore the risk of loss on the loan, and the risk of ensuring that a note was 
prepared and signed and that a trust deed was prepared and signed conforming to the 
note. 
Further, vague references in the trust deed to a note that was never signed by any 
party, let alone the Trustor, for an amount different than what was actually loaned, with 
no terms, interest or due date, cannot operate as a matter of law to satisfy the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(l)(b)(1953 as amended). Moreover, the Trust 
Deed was not a valid agreement because Allen Olsen never signed or even knew of the 
promissory note referred to in the Trust Deed. The Andersons drafted a defective Trust 
Deed, since they wrongly asserted that Allen Olsen had a note obligation with them, yet 
failed to mention the obligation of Steve and Sheila Olsen at all. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-
19 and -20 require that a Trust Deed identify the correct obligated party in order to be 
valid. 
The Andersons' arguments regarding equitable estoppel are raised for the first 
time on appeal, and therefore should not be considered. 
Even if equitable estoppel is considered, the Andersons' claims fail since they 
admit they had no communication with Allen Olsen on which they supposedly could rely, 
and the Trust Deed itself is so vague as to the terms of the loan actually made that it 
cannot suffice as the sole communication upon which the Andersons could reasonably 
rely to prove estoppel. The Andersons' reliance was on Steve and Sheila Olsen's 
representations, not Allen Olsen's. Allen Olsen did not acquiesce in the Andersons' 
reliance, since the facts are undisputed that he was unaware of the loan the Andersons 
made to Steve and Sheila. The Andersons' supposed actions in reliance were not 
reasonable. They made no effort to contact Allen Olsen regarding the collateral, and 
prepared a defective Trust Deed that recited a nonexistent debt by Allen to them. The 
Andersons can still pursue Sheila Olsen for the debt. The Andersons have not met the 
high standard of review or their burden of proof for equitable estoppel. 
Other reasons support the trial court's ruling. These include the Andersons' 
failure to comply with the requirement in Utah Code Ann. §§57-1-19 and -20 that a trust 
deed identify the correct obligated party to be valid, and that there was no meeting of the 
minds between Allen Olsen and the Andersons since the facts demonstrate that they both 
viewed this transaction very differently. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
This case deals with the validity of a Trust Deed. Allen Olsen pledged this Trust 
Deed as collateral for the sole purpose of allowing his son Steve to borrow the money he 
needed to buy Allen's insurance business. However, Steve told Allen a few days after 
the Trust Deed was signed that he was no longer going to buy the business, and Allen 
understood that the deal was then off and that the Trust Deed was of no force, and would 
not be used for any other purpose. R. 115-116, 320. 
The Trust Deed (which was prepared by the Andersons - R. 319) referred to a 
Note of even date by Allen Olsen in favor of the Andersons. R. 26. However, the 
Andersons have never produced a copy of this note, and Allen Olsen never signed any 
such note, and never even saw such note or was made aware of its terms or its existence. 
Allen Olsen never had any communications whatsoever with the Andersons regarding 
this Trust Deed and/or note. R. 26-28, 56-57, 123-124, 320. The Andersons have 
admitted there is no signed note. R. 346, 11:10-17. 
The trial court ruled that the Trust Deed was not a valid agreement between Allen 
Olsen and the Andersons because of failure of consideration (Allen did not receive what 
he bargained for and expected from Steve, namely Steve's purchase of his insurance 
business), and because Allen Olsen never signed a Note to evidence the debt under the 
Trust Deed. R. 321-322. The Andersons are appealing these two points. 
I. The Trust Deed is Invalid for Lack of Consideration and for Failure of 
Consideration. 
When Steve told Allen a few days after the Trust Deed was signed that he was no 
longer going to buy the business (R. 320), it was clear that the agreed exchange (security 
from Allen in exchange for purchase money from Steve) would not take place. The deal 
upon which the Trust Deed was based was off R. 314. The Andersons then 
subsequently issued a larger loan to Steve and Sheila Olsen ($151,000 instead of the 
$ 140,000 referred to in the Trust Deed) knowing that it was to pay off personal debts, not 
to buy the business. R. 220-221. The Trust Deed lacked any consideration. 
Notwithstanding, if this court finds the Trust Deed remained valid after Allen 
Olsen and his son's deal was off, the Trust Deed is still invalid for failure of 
consideration. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that "formation of a contract 'requires 
a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a 
consideration.' Consideration sufficient to support the formation of a contract requires 
that 'a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.5" Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. 
Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998) citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 
17(1); § 71 (1981). A trust deed cannot be used as security for a loan where no 
consideration was given to the party providing the trust deed. Pacific American 
Construction v. Security Union Title, 987 P.2d 45 (Utah 1999). 
Furthermore, "when one party to a valid contract commits an 'uncured material 
failure' in its performance of the contract, the non-failing party is relieved of its duty to 
continue to perform under the contract. Aquagen, 972 P.2d at 414, citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, § 237 (1981). This failure of consideration occurs when one "has 
either given or promised to give some performance [and] fails without his fault to receive 
in some material respect the agreed exchange for that performance." Aquagen Int'l, Inc. 
v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413-14 (Utah 1998). Where a party is "neither a lender 
nor a borrower," and receives no consideration in exchange for the use of a trust deed of 
its property as security for a loan, there is failure of consideration. Pacific American, 987 
P.2d at Tf 7. That is what occurred here. Allen Olsen was neither the lender nor the 
borrower in any transaction with the Andersons. Allen failed to receive the purchase 
money from Steve that he had bargained for. Indeed, Allen received nothing. Hence, 
there was a complete failure of consideration. The Andersons even acknowledged this at 
the summary judgment hearing, when their counsel admitted that Allen Olsen's "claim 
that he didn't receive a benefit from it probably is true." R. 346, 27:19-21. 
It is important to note that Allen Olsen had no communications whatsoever with 
the Andersons, and never bargained with them for any exchange of consideration; neither 
did he ever enter into any agreement with them. R. 115-116. Yet, even if an agreement 
between Allen Olsen and the Andersons could somehow be found based on the Trust 
Deed, there was never any discussion or agreement between them that Allen's 
consideration would somehow be satisfied by way of Steve and Sheila receiving a larger 
amount of money from the Andersons to pay off their personal debts. Id. There simply 
was no communication at all between the parties in respect to what the Andersons are 
now claiming was a binding agreement between them. Allen Olsen's sole discussions 
and bargaining was with his son Steve, for the purchase of the insurance business. 
Allen's expected consideration was solely payment for the business from Steve, not the 
separate receipt by Steve and Sheila of money from the Andersons. 
The Andersons confuse the agreement they made with Steve and Sheila Olsen to 
lend them money to pay personal debts with the agreement between Steve and Allen that 
Steve would buy Allen's insurance business. They assert that these agreements were 
somehow one and the same. However, they openly acknowledge the failure of 
consideration in this case, by admitting that "consideration does not run from the 
Andersons to Allen Olsen." Anderson's Brief, at 8. In order to get around this rather 
serious problem, they assert that it is sufficient if consideration was given to Steve. In so 
saying they overlook the fact that Allen never agreed that his consideration would be 
satisfied if Steve received money. Again, Allen Olsen and the Andersons never spoke or 
communicated. Rather, Allen bargained solely with Steve for receipt of the money for 
the insurance business, which he never received. Why? Because the deal was off. 
Because he never received these funds from Steve, he failed to receive the consideration 
he bargained for and expected, and consideration therefore completely failed. 
In short, the Andersons assume that since the collateral supplied to them by Steve 
and Sheila Olsen for their personal loan to pay off debts was an asset belonging to Allen 
Olsen, he somehow became bound to the Andersons' transaction with Steve and their 
daughter, even though Allen knew nothing about this transaction and was not in 
agreement with it. If such were the law, any party who could convince another to loan 
him money by using an asset belonging to a third party could bind that third party to pay 
off his own loan, even though the third party knew nothing about it. Such an 
interpretation cannot stand. 
The Andersons cite Knox v. First Security Bank of Utah, 196 F.2d 112, 118(10 
Cir. 1952) for the proposition that "it is not necessary that the consideration pass directly 
from the obligee to the obligor. It is sufficient if there be detriment or disadvantage to the 
obligee and an element of benefit or advantage to the obligor, or to a third person at his 
request." (emphasis added) However, this is not a case where two parties communicated 
with each other and agreed that the consideration that would normally go to one of them 
would be given instead to a third party, as contemplated by Knox. Allen Olsen never 
requested that the alleged consideration be given to Steve rather than himself. Indeed, he 
made no requests of the Andersons at all. Rather, he bargained with Steve for Steve to 
purchase his business, and requested of Steve that he be directly paid for it. Hence, Allen 
himself was to receive the consideration here, not a third party. The Andersons concede 
that Allen did not receive what he had bargained for. R. 346, 27:18-21. 
Furthermore, the trial court in this case specifically found that "the parties in this 
case are not in any fiduciary relationship to each other. Steve did not act on behalf of 
Allen when he obtained his loan from the Plaintiffs." R. 322. The Andersons have not 
appealed or disputed this finding, and thereby concede that Steve's receipt of money from 
the Andersons was not on Allen's behalf and was not given pursuant to an assignment of 
Allen's consideration to Steve. Hence, Allen received no consideration vicariously when 
Steve got the money from the Andersons. Rather, Allen was still waiting for the 
consideration he had bargained for, the money to buy the business from Steve. He never 
received it, and consideration failed. 
Indeed, Knox is entirely different from this case because the third party in Knox 
had no involvement at all in the transaction. Rather, one of two parties to a traditional 
contract asserted that the third party had assumed his obligation to the other party. The 
present case is different from this, since Steve Olsen, who the Andersons say is the third 
party here, had an obligation to the Andersons, which the Andersons are asserting 
somehow passed to Allen Olsen. The facts of Knox, simply do not fit this case. 
Furthermore, a year after Knox I, the same 10* Circuit revisited the issues in Knox v. 
First Security Bank of Utah, 206 F.2d 823 (10 Cir. 1953), and found that there was no 
consideration, and that alleged claims against the third party were distinct and separate 
from those against the obligated party. Id, at 825-826. 
The simple reality is that the Andersons are understandably trying to avoid the loss 
of their loan to Steve and Sheila Olsen by passing it to another party. However, as stated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Pacific American, "a lender ... is in the best position to 
insure that the debt underlying a mortgage is valid. Thus ... the lender bears the risk that 
the mortgage debt is invalid." Pacific American, 987 P.2d at U 9. Since Plaintiffs knew 
they were receiving collateral from a third party, they needed to exercise due diligence to 
make sure the collateral was satisfactory. Any party lending money knows that it should 
make at least a marginal effort at due diligence, to verify that the collateral being offered 
is bona fide and can be relied on. This is especially true if the lender is planning to 
disperse a loan of over $150,000, and the party receiving the loan and offering the 
collateral admits that it does not belong to him, but that its owner is supposedly in 
agreement with the transaction. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Jardine v. 
Brunswick, 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 1967): 
The one who complains of being injured by such a false representation cannot 
heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but has the duty of exercising such 
degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised by an ordinary, 
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is 
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own 
neglect. 
Id. at 662-663. It is hard to imagine any lender accepting collateral that belonged to 
another party without at least trying to make contact with that other party to verify his 
support of the deal. All Plaintiffs needed to do was pick up the phone and call Allen 
Olsen to verify that he was in agreement with the use of this property as collateral on this 
personal loan to Steve and Sheila to pay their personal debts. They cannot now expect 
him to bear the consequences for their failure to do so. 
The question of who should bear the risk of loss in this type of situation was 
addressed in Utah Farm Prod. Credit v. Hansen, 738 P.2d 642 (Utah App. 1987). In that 
case, a farm debtor sold animals at auction and pocketed the money, contrary to his 
agreement with his secured lender that the lender would receive the proceeds. The lender 
then sued the auction for the proceeds of the sale. The court noted that uthe issue, at its 
most fundamental level, is who should bear the loss" in such a circumstance, as between 
the lender and a third party. Id. at 643. The court determined that the lender should bear 
this burden, and further noted that a lender cannot prevail if it has not properly drafted 
and filed the necessary security documents. The court stated that "we believe the public 
policy of Utah requires plaintiff lender to bear the loss in this case. The lender should be 
motivated to protect itself and is in a superior position to do so. The lender sets the 
conditions of security and repayment of the loan at the time the loan is made." Id. at 645. 
Hence, the lender bears the risk because the "lender is in [a] superior position to protect 
its interests with power to set conditions of security and repayment." Webb v. Interstate 
Land Corp., 920 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1996) citing Utah Farm Products. 
Applying this public policy to the case at hand, it is clear that the Andersons as 
lenders bore the risk of their loan to their daughter and son-in-law. They failed to 
properly prepare the security documents, since the Trust Deed they prepared made 
reference to a note that was never signed and that Allen Olsen never even saw (R. 115-
116), there was not any document that contained terms of default. The Andersons as 
lenders were responsible to perform at least minimal due diligence to ensure that the 
named Trustor under the Trust Deed was in agreement with the transaction. Again, all 
they needed to do was pick up the phone and call Allen Olsen, but they chose instead to 
trust the representations alone of Steve and Sheila Olsen. They knew that the loan was in 
a different amount than that identified in the trust deed and was not for the purpose of 
Steve buying the business, but was for Steve and Sheila to pay off personal debts. R. 
220-221. The Andersons assert that in spite of all this there was somehow an agreement 
between them and Allen Olsen. However, they admit that they never communicated with 
Allen Olsen at all with respect to this alleged agreement, or verified that his consideration 
could be given to Steve and Sheila instead. Appellant's brief at 5. They further admit 
that Allen Olsen received no benefit from this transaction. R. 346, 27:18-21. 
In sum, because there was a lack of consideration and a complete failure of 
consideration, the ruling of the trial court was not in error, and must be sustained. 
II. The Trust Deed Itself is not an Agreement or other Promise to Pay the Debt 
of Another that Satisfies Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(l)(b). 
Utah law states that a party cannot be charged with the debt or default of another 
unless there is an express written agreement signed by the party to be charged. Utah 
Code Ann. §25-5-4(l)(b). Allen Olsen never agreed to answer for the debts of his 
daughter-in-law and son. R. 115-116. He only agreed to allow limited use of the trust 
deed so that his son could buy the insurance business. Notwithstanding this, the 
Andersons are trying to twist the trust deed into an obligation on the part of Allen Olsen 
to remedy the debt of their daughter and Allen's son. However, pursuant to the statute of 
frauds, the Andersons cannot charge Allen Olsen with the debt or default of their 
daughter and son-in-law without first showing there was a writing that Allen agreed to 
answer for this debt. As has been noted above, the only writing in this case is the Trust 
Deed. 
The trial court concluded that this requirement of the statute of frauds would be 
met if the Trust Deed were a valid agreement, and then concluded that it was not a valid 
agreement because of failure of consideration and the lack of a note to accompany it. R. 
312-314. While Allen agrees that the Trust Deed is not valid for these reasons, he also 
asserts that it could not satisfy the statute of frauds even without these reasons. This is 
because the Trust Deed did not even identify the parties (Steve and Sheila Olsen) whose 
debt was being assumed, and because no promissory note or any other writing evidencing 
the debt existed including terms of repayment and events of default. It seems fairly 
straightforward that a document showing that a party assumed the debts of another must 
indicate, among other things, who the debtor is. This point was answered in Fontaine v. 
Gordon Contr., 567 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. App. 2002), in which a party claimed that a credit 
application violated the statute of frauds requirement regarding assuming the debts of 
another "because it fails to identify the principal debtor. If he is correct that the principal 
debtor is unidentified, that omission mandates reversal under a line of cases going back to 
1982." Id, at 325 (citations omitted). 
The Trust Deed itself is no promise to pay. A Trust Deed merely pledges 
collateral to secure a debt evidenced by a note. In this case, no signed note ever existed; 
neither was there ever any debt obligation by Allen Olsen to the Andersons, contrary to 
what they initially claimed at the commencement of this suit. See R. 18, at ^ 10, and 
compare to R. 184-185. While Steve and Sheila Olsen had a debt with the Andersons 
that is supposedly somehow linked to the Trust Deed, they and their debt are not even 
mentioned at all in said Trust Deed, and the amount of their debt also differs from that 
identified in the Trust Deed. Further, the Trust Deed gives no information about the debt 
supposedly being assumed other than the amount, again including no payment schedule, 
payment due date or events of default. 
This point regarding the statute of frauds was addressed in Automotive 
Manufacturer's Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). 
The court discussed whether a party, as an apparent officer of a debtor, was personally 
liable as a guarantor by having co-signed a promissory note and security agreement of the 
debtor. The court indicated that there was no such personal guaranty, saying u[h]ad the 
parties wanted a guaranty agreement on the open account they should have either 
executed a separate document or at the very least they should have made explicit 
provisions therefor in the other documents. The law requires that promises to answer for 
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another be written." Id. at 1036. The court then cited 
the same section of the statute of frauds discussed above. The court further stated that 
"[pjlaintiff has cited no authority (nor have we independently been able to find any) 
which even suggests that typical recitals in an inventory security agreement should be 
treated as a guaranty or similar document used in obtaining the promise of one party to 
stand good for the obligations of another." Id. The same reasoning applies here. There 
is no authority supporting the Andersons' claim that typical recitals in a Trust Deed can 
on 
satisfy the statute of frauds in respect to a "promise of one party to stand good for the 
obligations of another." Furthermore, if the Andersons had wanted the Trust Deed to say 
this, they should have "made explicit provisions therefor" in the Trust Deed and/or other 
documents. 
As noted above, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-19 and -20 provide that a Trust Deed 
identify the proper party obligated for the indebtedness in order to be valid. The statute 
of frauds confirms this requirement, since it indicates that the required writing identify 
the parties whose debt is being assumed. It should also identify and describe the debt 
being assumed with sufficient clarity for there to be no mistake regarding what the 
instrument is for, and what it covers. There was no such identification and information in 
the Trust Deed, and therefore said Trust Deed cannot satisfy the requirements of the 
statute of frauds. 
III. Allen Olsen Never Signed the Note Referred to in the Trust Deed; Equitable 
Estoppel is a New Issue, Impermissibly Raised for the First Time on Appeal; 
Equitable Estoppel Does not Apply in this Case. 
In their second issue, the Andersons mix and confuse two separate issues, namely: 
(1) whether the lack of a signed note referenced in a Trust Deed is fatal to said Trust 
Deed; and (2) whether equitable estoppel should apply in the specific facts of this case. 
Each issue will be discussed below, along with a discussion of whether the actual issue 
(equitable estoppel) raised by the Andersons can even be addressed at all, since it appears 
to be a new issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Lack of a Note Referenced in a Trust Deed is Fatal to Said Trust Deed 
The Andersons ckim the trial court erred in its conclusion that the Trust Deed was 
not valid because Allen Olsen never signed a promissory note to evidence the debt under 
the Deed of Trust. However, the Andersons do not develop or articulate this claim, or 
even say much about it, and even concede that no note was signed by Allen (Andersons' 
Brief, at 5), and that they probably cannot pursue Allen for any deficiency even if they 
foreclose on the property. R. 346, 26:13-15. It must be remembered that the Andersons 
themselves prepared the Trust Deed at issue. R. 319. As such, they had the opportunity 
to shape that Trust Deed any way they wanted, and to prepare a Note to go along with it. 
They had the opportunity to say within the Trust Deed that the security was in respect to 
a loan by them to Steve and Sheila Olsen, and that Steve and Sheila Olsen had the 
obligation to repay this loan. However, not only did the Andersons fail to word it this 
way, but they specifically stated in the Trust Deed that it was given for the purpose of 
securing "payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date 
hereof in the principal sum of $140,000.00, made by Trustor, payable to the order of 
Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth." R. 26 
(emphasis added). Allen Olsen never signed any note setting forth the times, manner and 
interest of the debt. Indeed, he did not even know that this alleged note existed, and the 
Andersons have never produced a copy of this alleged note. R. 56-57. Moreover, the 
actual loan was for an amount different than that recited in the Trust Deed. 
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 The Trust Deed identified Allen and Maxwen Olsen as the Trustors. R. 26. As noted in 
the facts above, Maxwen Olsen is now deceased. R. 319. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(3) defines a Trust Deed as a deed made pursuant to the 
statutory requirements for Trust Deeds "and conveying real property to a trustee in trust 
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person named in the 
deed to a beneficiary." (emphasis added). This language is repeated in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-20, which states that "transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the 
performance of an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed 
to a beneficiary." (emphasis added). The language in the statutes is clear and 
unmistakable. If the Trust Deed is to secure an obligation of a third party, the Trust Deed 
needs to clearly say so. The Andersons who prepared the Trust Deed at issue, and who 
were fully aware of their loan arrangement with Steve and Sheila Olsen, did not mention 
them at all in the Trust Deed, but said instead that the note "of even date herewith" was 
solely between them and Allen Olsen. However, Allen Olsen never signed or even saw 
any such note. R. 56-57. Since the Andersons had the opportunity to create the 
arrangement that they are now asserting, but chose not to do so, they should not now be 
allowed to go back in time and recreate their arrangement. Simply put, the Andersons are 
asking this court to defy the law because they do not want to assume responsibility for 
loaning money to Steve and Sheila Olsen without having even bothered to ask Allen 
Olsen about Steve's use of the Trust Deed as collateral. Such a result would be neither 
legal nor fair. 
The Equitable Estoppel Issue Asserted by the Andersons Cannot be Addressed Since it is 
being Raised for the First Time on Appeal 
Under the heading of lack of a Trust Deed Note, the Andersons argue a completely 
new issue, that equitable estoppel requires recognition of a binding agreement in this case 
irrespective of the note. Interestingly, this argument could just as easily have been raised 
in respect to failure of consideration—that the Andersons relied to their detriment on the 
Trust Deed signed by Allen Olsen, and that Allen should be estopped from asserting that 
failure of consideration renders the Trust Deed invalid. This estoppel argument was 
never raised or mentioned by the Andersons in any of their pleadings, and only arose 
from a passing comment by the judge at the hearing that he assumed the Andersons may 
be asserting estoppel, followed by agreement by the Anderson's counsel. R. 346, 27:8-9; 
27:23-25; 28:1-3. The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order make no mention of 
estoppel, and the court did not rule on the issue (R. 309-323) as was admitted by the 
Andersons in their Brief. Andersons' Brief at 9. The elements of estoppel are not 
discussed anywhere in the record, nor were they presented and discussed by the 
Andersons' counsel at the hearing, and Allen Olsen never had adequate opportunity to 
address this issue before the trial court. In sum, this is an issue that is being raised for the 
first time on appeal, which is not permissible. Dominguez v. Heward, 2006 UT App 20; 
see also Holmes Development, L.C. v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, Tf 31. 
A similar occurrence was discussed by the court in U.S. v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971 
(10 Cir. 1986), regarding whether the issue of a pat down search was properly raised in 
the trial court. The court noted that "neither the appellant's motion nor the memorandum 
in support of the motion mentioned ... the issue," and that the issue was only mentioned 
in passing at the suppression hearing. Id. at 975-76. The court stated that "the record 
itself is devoid of complete factual development to a determination of the issue. Whether 
appellant was subjected to a pat down search was first mentioned by his counsel and the 
circumstance assumed to be the case. It was never established. There was insufficient 
exploration or development of the circumstances of the search, the threat, or lack thereof, 
confronting the officers and just what took place surrounding the search of appellant to 
allow an accurate determination of the ... issue." Id. at 976. The court concluded that 
"where a party has shifted his position on appeal and 'advances arguments available but 
not presented' to the trial court 'and where a party has had ample opportunity to make the 
point in the trial court in a timely manner' the issue will not be entertained on appeal." 
Id. citing U.S. v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 537 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Such is also the case here. The issue of equitable estoppel is being raised for the 
first time on appeal, and should therefore not be considered by the court. 
Even if Equitable Estoppel is Considered, it Does not Apply in the Facts of This Case 
The following discussion regarding the merits of the Andersons' equitable 
estoppel claim is provided in case the court determines that the issue is properly before it. 
A party asserting a claim for equitable estoppel has the burden of establishing that 
the elements of the claim are met. Crimson v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 
1219, 1223 (Utah App. 1987). The standard of review for such a claim is higher, because 
equitable estoppel requires heavy reliance on the facts. Butler, Crockett at \ 45. Yet, 
even if we address the merits of the Andersons' estoppel claim, it is readily apparent that 
their assertion of reliance and equitable estoppel is misplaced. They admit that they had 
no communication whatsoever with Allen Olsen, but that they negotiated with Steve and 
Sheila Olsen. Andersons' Brief, at 4-5. Hence, they relied on Steve and Sheila Olsen's 
representations regarding this loan, not Allen's. If estoppel applies at all in this case, it 
applies only between them and Steve and Sheila. Indeed, given their complete lack of 
communication with Allen, it is difficult to understand how they can assert that he made 
any representation to them upon which they relied. 
This point is made more clear when considering the elements of an equitable 
estoppel claim. These are: (1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted by that party; (2) reasonable action taken by the 
other party in reliance on the first's party's statement, admission or act; and (3) injury to 
the second party resulting from the first party's repudiation of its act. CECO Corp. v. 
Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989). Under the first element, 
the Andersons admit there was no statement or admission from Allen Olsen to them, 
since they admit they never even communicated with Allen. Andersons' Brief at 5. 
There was no failure to act in this case either. There was only the Trust Deed, signed by 
Allen for the sole purpose of allowing his son to use it as collateral to obtain a loan to buy 
the insurance business. R. 56-57. It is immediately apparent that Allen's signing of this 
Trust Deed is fully consistent with his later claim that it is invalid, because he signed it 
solely for the narrow purpose of allowing Steve to get the money to buy his business, and 
not to be used as collateral for any other loan in any other amount. R. 115-116. Allen 
Olsen never agreed or acquiesced in the Trust Deed being used for any other purpose. R. 
115-116. The Andersons knew when they gave Steve the money that it was not for Steve 
to buy the business, but the loan was in a different amount than that given in the Trust 
Deed and was for Steve and Sheila to pay off personal debts. R. 220-221. 
Cases that discuss equitable estoppel indicate that the doctrine only applies if the 
party seeking to repudiate his act acquiesced in the other party's reliance. Fisher v. 
Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1995)(party acquiesced in oral modification of 
contract, and therefore could not later repudiate the same); Lanier v. Industrial Comm fn 
of Utah, 694 P.2d 625 (Utah 1985)(no evidence that hospital acquiesced in employee's 
failure to report absences which supposedly resulted in termination, and therefore no 
equitable estoppel); Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979)(there was no waiver or 
acquiescence by Defendant to free Plaintiff from child support obligation, and therefore 
his claim of equitable estoppel failed). Courts have also indicated that a party's mere 
silence is not enough to lead another party to rely on that silence and claim an 
acquiescence or estoppel. Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979). There must be an 
affirmative act or statement that leads them to their reliance. In the present case, Allen 
Olsen never acquiesced in Steve using the Trust Deed to obtain a loan in a different 
amount and for a different purpose (to pay personal debts rather than buy the business). 
R. 115-116. Allen clearly would have objected had he known that is what Steve did. The 
Andersons knew when they granted the loan that it was not for purchase of the business, 
but was for Steve and Sheila to pay off personal debts. R. 220-221. Allen's silence 
cannot be interpreted as approval because he simply did not know what had occurred. R. 
115-116. 
The second element of equitable estoppel clearly calls for reasonable action taken 
by the relying party on the basis of the statement or act relied on. Ceco, at 970. In the 
present case, even assuming that there was somehow a statement or act of Allen Olsen 
that the Andersons relied on, it was not reasonable for the Andersons to fail to make any 
effort to communicate with Allen Olsen to verify his consent to use of his collateral to 
secure a loan of over $150,000 to a third party. Likewise, it was not reasonable for them 
to loan such a large amount of money to third parties based on a Trust Deed that did not 
even mention these third parties or their note obligation as required by Utah law (Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-19 and -20), but which said instead that it only secured a (nonexistent) 
note by Allen Olsen to the Andersons. As noted above, the public policy in Utah is that a 
lender bears the risk of loss in a case such as this. Utah Farm Products, at 645. 
Furthermore, as stated by the court in Brixen & Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d 
1039, 1043 (Utah App.1989), "estoppel is an equitable doctrine which precludes parties 
from asserting their rights where their actions render it inequitable to allow them to assert 
those rights." Id., at 1043. In other words, a party must do equity in order to receive 
equity. Such is not the case here. The Andersons are asserting an equitable theory when 
they acted inequitably themselves by making no effort to contact Allen Olsen before 
accepting the trust deed as collateral, and by preparing a defective Trust Deed that 
referenced a nonexistent loan obligation of Allen Olsen. Their present resort to equity is 
merely an effort to remedy these errors. 
The final element of equitable estoppel is injury to the claiming party. In this 
regard, the Andersons assert that "Steven Olsen has discharged his debts in bankruptcy, 
and the deed of trust is the only recourse the Andersons have to recover any of what they 
loaned to Allen Olsen's son." Andersons' Brief, at 10. This assertion is contrary to the 
record, which indicates that the loan was made not only to Steve Olsen but also to the 
Andersons' daughter Sheila, for the purpose of paying her and Steve's personal debts.4 
R. 105-106, 115, 190-193, 220-221. The Andersons could still pursue Sheila for the loan 
amount, but have apparently chosen not to do so or to even name her as a party. They 
seek instead to foist her debt onto Allen Olsen by pursuing the Trust Deed at issue. This 
is hardly equitable behavior by a party seeking equity. 
It must again be remembered that the standard of review is higher for a claim of 
equitable estoppel, and that the claimant bears the burden of proving such a claim, which 
claim bears heavily on the facts. Butler, Crockett at f^ 45; Crimson, at 1223. The facts in 
this case do not support equitable estoppel. The Andersons have simply not met their 
burden in this case. 
IV. There are Other Reasons the Trial Court's Ruling Should be Affirmed. 
Allen Olsen will now present several related reasons why the trial court's ruling 
should be affirmed in this case. These points either relate to the issues appealed by the 
Andersons, or are issues that were raised before the trial court. While the Andersons did 
not base their appeal on all of these issues, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "we 
may affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground, even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling." State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 fn. 4, (Utah 
App. 1991)(citations omitted). This is true even if such an argument is made for the first 
time on appeal, in the case of an affirmance of the trial court's ruling. Id, 
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 Allen Olsen asserted the fact that the loan was to both Steve and Sheila Olsen in 
paragraph 3 of his Motion for Summary Judgment, which was supported by Affidavit, 
and repeated this fact in his Memo in Opposition to the Andersons Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 105-106, 115, 190-193. The Andersons acknowledged that they did not 
dispute this fact in their response and reply to these pleadings. R. 131, 222-223. 
The Trust Deed is not Valid or Enforceable on its Face 
As was discussed above, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-19 and -20 require that a Trust 
Deed must identify any third party that is obligated for the underlying indebtedness in 
order to be valid. The Trust Deed at issue did not identify any third party as the obligated 
party (R. 26-28), but only identified Allen Olsen as the obligated party. However, Allen 
has never signed or even seen a note evidencing that he personally had any debt 
obligation to the Andersons, and in fact does not have any such obligation. R. 115-116. 
Indeed, the Andersons have admitted that "the deed of trust executed by Allen Olsen was 
a promise to provide security to the Andersons for a loan the Andersons subsequently 
made to Allen Olsen's son, Steven." Andersons' Brief, at 6. Hence, the Andersons 
acknowledge that Allen is not the obligated party, but Steve is. The Trust Deed is 
therefore defective and unenforceable on its face due to this failure to meet the 
requirements of the statute and identify the proper obligated party. 
This was not the only problem with the Trust Deed however. Since there was no 
note and no identification of what triggered default, there is nothing to indicate that a 
default has even occurred and that the Trust Deed may be foreclosed upon. The 
Andersons have pointed to nothing in the record to show such a default other than their 
own verbal claims. R. 185. It is difficult to understand how the Andersons can foreclose 
a Trust Deed when they have not even established that a default occurred. Hence, it is 
again seen that the Trust Deed is unenforceable by its own terms. 
There was no Meeting of the Minds 
Any binding contract between two parties must have the mutual assent and 
meeting of the minds of the parties regarding their intent. As the court stated in Nielsen 
v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600, (Utah 2003), "it is fundamental that a meeting of the minds 
on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract." 
Furthermore, "so long as there is any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations 
or considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, 
there is no contract at all." Id. at 602 f^ 11 (citations omitted). 
As is abundantly clear from the recitation of facts and the discussion above, there 
was no meeting of the minds of the parties in this case. The Andersons admit that they 
never communicated with Allen Olsen. Andersons5 Brief, at 5. It is difficult to 
understand how there can be a meeting of the minds between parties who have not even 
spoken to each other. Furthermore, there is no note accompanying the Trust Deed (R. 
346, 11:10-17), and the Trust Deed itself does not contain any note terms or any triggers 
of default. R. 26-28. While the Andersons seem to be aware of what these terms are, 
Allen Olsen was completely unaware of any such terms. R. 115-116, 185. Indeed, Allen 
Olsen was unaware of the creation of the loan to pay off personal debts that the 
Andersons made to Steve and Sheila Olsen, and never would have agreed to let his 
collateral be used for them to obtain such a loan. R. 115-116. Allen thought the Trust 
Deed was moot and void after Steve told him he would not buy the business, and had no 
idea anyone would assert rights until this suit was filed. R. 115-116. However, the 
Andersons apparently assert that it is still viable. As can be seen, the facts confirm that 
there are a number of essential terms of the alleged agreement that the parties understood 
very differently. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that there was no meeting of 
the minds between Allen Olsen and the Andersons. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The Trust Deed at issue was not a valid agreement because there was failure of 
consideration, and Allen Olsen never signed a Trust Deed Note. The Andersons' 
arguments regarding equitable estoppel should be disregarded, since they have raised this 
issue for the first time on appeal. However, even if the merits of equitable estoppel are 
addressed, it does not apply in this case. The trust Deed is also deficient on its face, since 
it failed to meet the requirements of the statute, there was no meeting of the minds, and it 
failed to satisfy the statute of frauds regctrding the assumption of the debt of another. 
Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ZA day of October 2006. 
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